EU as a Global Power by Jarvad, Gulliver Boe et al.
      
EU as a Global Power 
 
Nicklas Bo Nielsen 
Johan Salto Heide Mamsen 
Gulliver Boe Jarvad 
 
International Studies (IS) 
BP3 
Supervisor: Johannes Kabderian Dreyer 
Political Science – Economics 
18.12.2013 
 
  2 
Abstract: 
 
The purpose of this project is to present strengths and weaknesses of the European Union, in 
connection to the concept of power. We will mainly focus on economic and political aspects 
of EU; we took that decision in order to narrow down our area of research and limit our 
investigation. We investigate whether or not the European Union can be perceived as a 
superpower like the United States or has the potential to acquire the attributes required to 
gain this specific ‘power’ status in the future. We start out by defining the concept of power 
with the help of two prominent American theorists respectively, Stephen Haseler and Robert 
Kagan and follow up on this concept by constantly contesting our empirical material with 
that definition. In our analyzing section, we illustrate strengths and weaknesses of EU’s 
current situation politically and economically, and compare these conditions with the current 
ones in the superpower nation of The United States. We will then proceed by discussing the 
similarities and dissimilarities between The United States and EU in relation to the concept of 
power, and propose a future pathway that might enhance EU’s global position. Lastly we will 
conclude on our knowledge based analysis and discussion. We illustrate what we have found 
to be the missing pieces in order for EU to be perceived as a global superpower, followed up 
by proposing what EU should do if they want to obtain the required attributes mentioned in 
our concept of power. 
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1. Introduction: 
 
In this chapter, we will present our problem area along with a problem description followed 
up by introducing a problem formulation with corresponding working questions. The 
problem area will outline the context of our investigation, and predictions of an end result. 
 
1.1 Problem Area: 
 
Robert Kagan and Stephen Haseler are amongst the theorists who have examined the EU’s 
future as a possible superpower. They both present differing assessments and measures of 
power in the international system and both have drawn heavy comparisons to the US. These 
definitions of power ranges from facets of soft power forms of diplomacy and economic 
advantages to materialistic, territorial and military hard power forms. It is clear from the 
selected theorists that whenever global power is referred or compared to it is with reference 
or comparison to The United States who constitutes what many theorists in addition to Kagan 
and Haseler depict as a de facto interchangeable with the concept of power and thereby 
interchangeable with the latter definition described above. With this constructed concept of 
power in mind one might ask why EU, with its territorial prosperity and relatively well-
educated population is not equally considered a superpower, at least not according to the 
majority of theorists. There are though some theorists who proclaim support for EU as a 
superpower or at least suggest what actions are necessary. It is then interesting to examine 
why the link between power as a theoretically constructed concept and The United States is 
not mirrored in the case of EU where the link seems to be broken or at least missing vital 
parts. It is here we find inspiration in the theorists that challenges the most common 
understanding of power and presents various fixes for the broken links or even a whole new 
link. Most interesting is the areas of a fiscal federalism as an economic enhancement for an 
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already high-ranking trait of the EU and also a higher degree of political unity. These two 
areas touch the fields of economics and political science and we aim to answer if higher 
degree of centralization and unity could positively change the global power position of the 
EU. We will investigate both subjects relatively separated and then unite our findings for a 
discussion of EU’s future power situation. All this is done, with our established concept of 
power as a vanishing point for our project. We wish not to invent a universal recipe for 
hegemony but we strive to logically deduct theoretical knowledge to an end result proposing 
how EU’s power, in accordance with how The United States has constituted the concept of 
power, would change if two selected areas of conflict were enhanced or reinvented. 
 
1.2 Hypothesis: 
 
We suspect that a higher degree of political centralization in the EU would improve its 
distinguishment on the global scene and give it legitimacy to improve common military 
strategies and thereby gain more global power 
 
We also suspect that a higher degree of economic centralization could result in stabilizing 
mechanism that would be similar to the fiscal federalist system in The United States.  
 
We suspect that both political and economic integration will result in greater materialistic 
powers and thereby get closer to the concept of power by Kagan and Haseler 
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1.3 Project description: 
 
Initially we wanted to develop predictions concerning the European Union’s possibilities of 
becoming a future superpower. We found such an assignment interesting since we are all 
European citizens, and would possibly be greatly affected if such a power shift on the global 
scene were to take place. It occurred to us that such predictions might be too vague, and that 
being a superpower entails a wide range of attributes that we would simply not have the time 
to cover in relation to our time schedule.  
Instead, we changed our field of research slightly and decided to investigate what the 
European Union lacks in order to be considered a global superpower like The United States. 
We agreed that defining the concept of power would be crucial in order to do such a research 
thoroughly. With the use of two theorists, respectively S. Haseler and R. Kagan who both 
have presented theories declaring their perception of power, we were able to define power as 
a concept in international relations.  
After defining the concept of power, we initiated a research describing what makes The 
United States a superpower. What attributes and faces of power does The United States 
possess and which ones are the most salient. At this point, we had acquired a great starting 
point in relation to finding out what the European Union lacks in order achieve the status of a 
global superpower.  
We quickly discovered that the current European Union is mainly a soft power with 
economic strength and not a major player on e.g. the military front like the United States.  
After reading several papers concerning the European Union’s role in the global arena, we 
decided that two things really catches the eye in relation to our research of EU’s global 
influence, and those two things became our working questions. 
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The lack of political unification within Europe is according to both of our theorists a major 
deterioration of its possibilities to evolve internationally. The fact that EU member states in 
many respects retain sovereignty aggravates the European political power.  
In addition, the matter of fiscal federalism in the European Union is of great importance in 
relation to our research. Fiscal federalism requires that governments within the EU shall be 
independent of each other but co-ordinate common interests. Each government shall have 
sufficient financial resources to function under its own control, but how does this correlate 
with EU law etc.     
 
1.4 Problem formulation 
 
How would a higher degree of centralization and unity change the global power position of 
the EU? 
 
1.5 Working Questions: 
 
1) How would an implementation of a fiscal federation system like the one in The United 
States change the economy of the EU? 
 
2) What would be needed in order reach higher degree of political unity in EU? 
 
2. Methods 
 
This sections aims to provide the reader with a description of our methodological approach, 
ontological considerations, interdisciplinarity, research techniques and process/structure.  
      The first section will explain how we work interdisciplinary and how the two courses 
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have complimented each other in order to answer our problem. The second section will 
explain the projects limitations. The third section will discuss how the ontology of our 
theories has influenced our own approach to the problem and what considerations we must 
take into account in our analysis and discussion. These considerations are primarily 
concerning the use and understanding of the concept of “power”. A section describing our 
qualitative research technique resulting ontology of our theories and how this approach fits 
them best follows this. The section will also include an outline on how we are working 
deductively. 
 
2.1 Working interdisciplinary with Political Science and Economy 
 
Our project is working with the courses of Economy and Political Science. In our working 
questions we strive towards implementing these courses the best way possible, in order to, in 
the end, answer our problem formulation with the best possible knowledge, obtained from the 
interdisciplinary research we have made, through the process of creating this project. 
 
Our working questions sounds as following: 
How would an implementation of a fiscal federation system like the one in The United States 
change the economy of the EU? 
- Economics. 
 
What would be needed in order reach higher degree of political unity in EU? 
- Political Science. 
  
From our point of view, the working questions are grossly divided between the two courses 
of Economy and Political Science. We will examine these working questions through each 
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course, and from these examinations we will reach to an analysis and a discussion, where we 
will include both courses to get a clear overview on the whole research, seen from different 
faculties – and through this we will obtain the best possible answer to our problem 
formulation. 
 
When working with questions or problems, with a certain degree of complexity, it can be 
almost impossible to address with a mono-disciplinary project work where only one faculty is 
utilized. 
Because of this limitation, project works at RUC are all interdisciplinary, so the problem-
oriented project work, which we are working with, is able to address more complex questions 
and problems, which are to be answered by the utilization of more than one faculty. 
Summing up, we will, through a interdisciplinary research, achieve a higher degree of 
overview when highlighting the problems we wish to investigate further. 
 
2.2 Limitations: 
 
Throughout our project work we acknowledged, that our ambitions might have been too far 
reaching in the initial phase of our research. We engaged in working with a major and 
complex institution, and decided to cover several major aspects, which in some respects; 
might have been unrealistic due to our timeframe.  
The fact that our research time has been limited is definitely reflected in certain sections of 
our project that perhaps is tangential to be superficial. We attempted to limit our scope so, we 
should not cover too many contents of EU but it might still be too ambitious.  
In our research of political unification within EU we have excluded several aspects that 
without doubt would be of interest in relation to our area of research. Thus our choice of 
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policies mentioned, correlates the best with our definition of power that resembles a recurrent 
vanishing point in all of our sections.  
Another quite straightforward limitation is the fact that we won’t be able to conclude with 
any measurable result, and therefore not really verify or falsify our hypothesis through 
quantitative measures, thus the issue of working deductively in a qualitative research. We 
will end up proposing missing links and necessities in relation to EU’s future development 
into a global superpower, by extracting knowledge from our empirical material, but we will 
not be able to measure the result. 
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2.3 Choice and theory and how it is relevant to the problem 
 
Most of recent literature concerning EU’s power finds itself in the category of comparative 
studies especially with The United States as a counterpart. It is by this comparison that the 
EU’s power stands in contrast. The most supportive authors claims that Europe has potential, 
or even already could be categorized, as a federal superpower equal to The United States. 
This view is mostly based on the European worldview, which differs a lot from the 
American. The primary power sources are the EU’s strong economy of a softer form of 
capitalism, the worlds biggest market and strong diplomacy. The other perception of EU’s 
future places it as subordinate to The United States. Authors from this side claims that EU 
cannot have a future as a superpower but will instead remain a regional governance system. 
Defense of national sovereignty will prevent the EU as becoming a federation and will at best 
be considered a confederation of nation states. External influence is therefore limited to the 
very closest countries and the diplomatic international powers will be limited if power is not 
centralized. We are using S. Haseler’s “Super-state – The new Europe and it’s Challenge to 
American Supremacy” and R. Kagan’s “Paradise and Power”. 
       It should be clear from the above descriptions that most literature, including Kagan and 
Haseler makes great use of both examining the possibility for EU as a future superpower but 
also draws heavy comparisons to The United States. Although our primary focus is on EU’s 
internal processes and organs it is helpful for us to understand how power is understood in 
American hegemonic perspective. As explained in the next section, we approach our study 
with a positivist ontological understanding of concepts and reality, which proclaims that the 
world system operates in a systematic and lawful manner with patterns similar to those of 
natural sciences. That means that, with The United States as a constant comparative part of 
our theories, we hold the belief that in order to examine the power of EU it must be examined 
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from an already existing superpower, namely The United States. This means that the concept 
of power, thereby adopting the ontology of both Kagan and Haseler, for us will be rather 
fixed.  
 
In other words: even though our goal is not to asses whether or not EU can become a 
superpower we will use The United States in our study in order for us to grasp the concept of 
“power” and thereby analyze which procedures or measurements the EU needs in order to 
reach the concept of power we have defined– with The United States as a “template” for 
“power”. 
The two theories on EU future have different outlines for how big an impact military power 
has and to what extend the economic power of EU can equalize that. Should they be strictly 
categorized, Stephen Haseler would fit into the first perception of EU future as described in 
the beginning of this section while Robert Kagan would be placed in the latter. This gives us 
a problem that we aim to answer with two theories opposing each other in many aspects but 
complimenting each other on some aspects as well. Both is very helpful for us in order to 
reach a conclusion and especially the points at which the theories disagrees will be useful in 
the discussion section. 
 
To sum up: the use of two contrasting theories will be utilized to answer our hypothesis and 
will extract key points from both theories for both analysis and discussion. It will furthermore 
more or less determine our methodological and ontological approach to the problem. 
 
2.4 The definition of power - ontological approach  
 
Our ontological and theoretical approach will inevitably cause an ideological concern. When 
we are analyzing the influence of the political (including military) aspect on the economy and 
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the other way around it should always be taken into account that opposing views on this field 
of IR also means opposing ontologies.  
 
We are using S. Haseler’s “Super-state – The new Europe and it’s Challenge to American 
Supremacy” and R. Kagan’s “Paradise and Power” as our two theories through which we will 
inductively approach. Our Problem formulation includes the word “power” and this concept 
and its different understandings will have a big role in our project. Different IR theoretical 
approaches means different definitions or outlines of what “power” is. Although both are in 
sense positivists concluding scientific knowledge from observable and in this case 
materialistic findings, they differ in the degree to which materialism is the center of 
empiricism. That influences their concept of power. This is explained more thoroughly 
below. 
 
From a positivist stance the ideal IR scientific knowledge consists of a “correspondence 
between reality and theory through systematic and unprejudiced observation, 
uncompromising honesty and rational, logical deduction. All knowledge must be verifiable 
through observation” (P.B Olsen, 2006, p. 154) The methodological approach to IR then 
implicates a focus on material forces which in these terms translates to e.g. military capacity, 
power balancing and state interactions, territory and economic situation. That is – concepts 
that can more or less be mathematically calculated and analyzed.  Though not self-declared 
and only derived from the work of “Paradise and Power” it is apparent that Robert Kagan has 
a neo-realist approach to IR. His reasoning and definitions of power has, from this, 
materialistic world-view a positivist position of research as he analyzes the impact of material 
forces.  
 
Stephen Haseler seemingly deducts his conclusions from existing theories of IR. That is just 
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as Kagan neo-realism but in a much higher degree of liberalism. This means a displacement 
of the concept of “power” from very materialistic to also include concepts as democratic 
values, softer capitalism and most importantly shared ideas and understanding of a European 
identity of freedom and equality. “Super-state – The new Europe and it’s Challenge to 
American Supremacy” does much as “Paradise and Power” base its theories on European 
future on “facts” and materialistic observations, especially concerning European economy 
and military, but it also makes distinctions between facts and normative judgments. Unlike 
Kagan the degree to which the meaning of “power” is discussed is much more visible and to 
some extend based on constructivist understandings. Concluding; the theory of Haseler, 
although positivistic in most aspects does also draw some conclusions from post-positivist 
ontology, thereby rejecting existing understandings of power and EU’s global position. We 
will though focus mostly on the positivist observations of EU when concluding our 
hypothesis which derives from the two theories of Kagan and Haseler 
 
The understanding of power is important for our study in order for us to conclude and 
analyze. We can only reach a scientific conclusion if the concept of power is not “floating” 
meaning that we also approach our problem with a positivist, in the sense of international 
relations, ontology and methodology. We will adopt these from our theories and the concept 
of power is then accordingly of a materialistic or neo-realistic nature, but at the same time 
taken the arguments of post-positivism into account for use in the discussion. The above 
comparison of ontology is in this sense important, as it is firstly important for us to 
distinguish between different power concepts. The arguments of post-positivism will not be 
set aside because they are not aligned with our ontology but instead encourage to a later 
methodological discussion which will challenge our findings on the analysis and discussion. 
It will give a more nuanced picture of the global understandings of power but also underline 
that we do not claim our findings to represent the true representation of EU’s powers but 
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rather a deductive reasoning of already existing theories. Secondly it will also help the reader 
to understand how we arrive at our conclusions knowing that deductive positivist ontology 
has shaped our conclusion.  
 
2.5 Research techniques: 
 
Qualitative research and arguments for working deductively: 
 
Since our motivation for this project was to explore the European Union on several levels, 
qualitative research came naturally. Qualitative research seeks to go into depth with a topic 
allowing for multiple types of theories and methods to be used, while quantitative research 
might face issues in the process of defining ‘power’ considering it is an abstract concept with 
multiple meanings and therefore not easily measured. Any real measurement of such a 
concept would therefore be hypothetical and would not correspond with the perception of 
‘power’ we have achieved through logical deduction.  
 
Our project is structured around empirical material but with a starting point in theory. Our 
carefully selected empirical material will constantly be contested by theory acknowledged 
beforehand, and through content analysis. In our theory section we have chosen to focus on 
the economic and political aspects of the European Union’s ‘power’, that might enhance or 
degrade it’s global position. 
 
Knowledge is the assessment of the significance of events and details, the significance 
deriving from a certain context and/or theory (P. Olsen, K. Pedersen, 2008, p. 239)  
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We have knowingly chosen to include several theorists with differing theories so that we 
would be able to establish a discussion in-between them while still including our own 
considerations. It is at this point important to mention, that we will be approaching most of 
our data qualitatively and thus shape the evolving project ahead, however with the goal of not 
getting too subjective/biased in our conclusions.  
 
To sum up, we will mainly be working qualitatively:  
Qualitative methods are explorative, i.e. they investigate or explore subjects. […] Qualitative 
methods are elaborative, which means “carefully prepared” (Harboe, 2010, p. 47-48), 
  
But still use quantitative data in order to present certain information we find relevant thus, we 
will process this data in a qualitative manner we find suitable for our project and our 
hypothesis.   
Furthermore, we have chosen to combine deductive reasoning with our qualitative research, 
which might seem unusual.  
Deductive reasoning takes a starting point in generalizations, and proceeds to see if these 
generalizations can be applied in specific instances. In our case these generalizations could 
e.g. be resembled in our gathered data about the European Union. We will work qualitatively 
with this data and commence with an analysis that will illustrate missing links etc. what the 
European Union lacks in order to become more powerful, thus a specific instance. We 
believe that the adoption of deductive reasoning will represent an important step in 
connection to ‘verifying’ our qualitative research findings.  
…Beginning with a theory, and collecting and examining data in systematic ways to see 
whether the theory is supported or should be rejected or modified. (Link 3) 
Through a thorough analysis of our empirical material, we believe to end up with a specific 
result either confirming or denying our hypothesis, thus the choice of combining qualitative 
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research and deductive reasoning.       
 
Research approach:  
 
This section will provide the reader with an overview of how we have both reached our 
problem and following hypothesis but also approach to the research. It will also provide an 
outline of the project structure which will be helpful to understand how we use our theory 
and most importantly which theories that will be utilized in different parts of the project. 
 
Described very briefly we have worked deductively – we have worked out a hypothesis from 
a concept of power constructed from two complimentary theories. This hypothesis is then 
analyzed along with a second set of theories, which will then, from our new findings confirm 
or disprove our hypothesis. The reason that we include more theory is that we wish to avoid 
confirming or denying the EU’s power status from the theories that in the first place 
established our projects definition of power. 
      It should from the beginning be clear that our research is not set out to confirm or 
disprove any existing theory on EU’s future power. Our strategy has from the beginning been 
to define or categorize the concept of power with the use of two theories that has somewhat 
differing or at least contrasting theories. This will give us a more balanced definition that 
extracts relevant points from both sides of the theoretical parameter. The way we establish 
the concept of power as it is used in the context of only our project can be described as 
inductive reasoning in the way that we move from specific observations to broader 
generalization. Our research from the problem formulation and onwards is though of 
deductive nature and the project should not be seen as using “mixed methods”. The inductive 
approach is merely an approach for us to use specific descriptions and measurements of 
power in order to create the definition of power from which our hypothesis and thereby 
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problem formulation will arise.  The way we define the concept is primarily with focus on the 
points where the two theories agree. That is in short, that the EU lacks a common military 
and that a lack of political unity exists also in the aspect of economy. However the points at 
which the theories conflict is also of big use for us later in the discussion, which will include 
a discussion on power, related to the EU. 
 
Before we move on to explain the process beyond the hypothesis, we will quickly sum up: we 
have inductively produced a hypothesis about what the EU is missing in order to align with 
the concept of power constructed from two complimentary theories of IR. 
 
From this point we will approach our project deductively. We now have a hypothesis which 
we will process with a before mentioned second set of theory. This theory could as well also 
have been used to form the concept of power. We have though chosen Kagan and Haseler as 
they are including all the aspects, though more superficial than rest of the theories, which has 
specific focus on areas of political unity and fiscal federalism. These will be useful for 
analyzing our hypothesis. The research takes a deductive form as we have worked out a 
hypothesis from theory which though observation/analysis/discussion will lead to a final 
confirmation or denial of the hypothesis. We have narrowed theory down to a hypothesis w 
can deductively test. We are not testing the original theory as that is too ambitious but the 
theory has shaped our hypothesis which proposes what the EU needs in order to reach the 
definition of power the theory propose. One could argue that if our hypothesis is proved 
wrong – that what we propose as power-enhancing measures of the EU – proves to still not 
align EU with the concept of power, then the theories from which our hypothesis arrives 
might lack some aspects of power, which is not included in their concept of power. If on the 
other hand we prove through our second set of theory that our hypothetical measures would 
in fact positively change the power level of the EU to align with our concept of power then 
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we would not only prove our hypothesis but also confirm the Kagan and Haselers 
materialistic understanding of power. It should though concluding be noted that as we adopt 
their positivistic ontology it also excludes analysis of metaphysical perspectives and concepts 
of power and our research is therefore ultimately deductive of nature as we do not strive to 
produce new knowledge but rather test already existing in an interesting perspective. 
 
2.6 Data 
 
In order to answer our problem we have used a variety of empirical material. The list of 
materials used is extensive. For the complete list of Authors, titles, internet sites and other 
material used in this project, we refer to the bibliography. Authors with different political, 
geographic and ideological backgrounds compose the collection of literature. The degrees to 
which the works touch the subject of European Integration also vary. Titles like “The 
Political Economy of European Integration – Theory and Analysis” and “Climate Change 
and European Leadership: A Sustainable Role for Europe?” are examples of references 
which has a more specific approach to European Integration. This might influence their 
overall approach to European power if the concept of power is merely defined from the point 
of one policy area. That is why we have also included several books with a more broad focus 
such as “External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor”. We believe the 
variety of our empirical material will provide the project with many opinions on European 
power, which is what we need in order to reach a conclusion on the concept of power and the 
hypothesis deriving therefrom. It should at last be noted that not all sources has the same 
weight in our project and some will be used more than others, as we also believe that some 
areas has more importance to our problem formulation than others. 
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3. Theory 
 
3.1 Robert Kagan’s description of power:  
 
Can and will Europe comply with the Americans, and if they are not willing to do this, will it 
have any significance (R. Kagan, 2003, p. 103)? According to Kagan there is already, after 
the Iraq crisis, a gap between The United States and the EU, because of the different interests, 
when talking in terms of interfering in the Middle East and the general foreign policies.  
Kagan foresees that the next crisis can enlarge the gap between the political interests of the 
EU and The United States, because of the conflicting foreign policies (R. Kagan, 2003, p. 
103). This gap will increase because of The United States continuous exercise of power, and 
the EU’s lack of it. 
 But when these crises are over and done with, the question of the real power relation 
between The United States and the EU will be enlightened. And the questions about this 
power, which according to Kagan; is the factor that separates the United States and Europe 
(R. Kagan, 2003, p. 103).  
 
If one day the ties that create the interdependens between Europe and the United States, such 
as political culture and the economy, will come forward in a more significant way. These ties 
will strengthen the power of EU, because of their political culture, and other things being 
equal, The United States military will be loosing significance because of the lack of necessity 
of the exertion of hard power. 
But according to Kagan, this is insignificant, because he believes that the task for both 
Europeans and Americans is to adapt to the new world order, and, according to Kagan, this 
imply “the realities of the American hegemony” (R. Kagan, 2003, p. 104).  
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The Americans are trying to defend and encourage a liberal international world order. But the 
only stabile and functioning world order, which is imaginable for the Americans, is the one 
exercised by The United States (R. Kagan, 2003, p. 100).  
 
Kagan argues that the willingness from The United States to exercise power is the main 
reason of their pole position as a power state in the world. And on the contrary, the EU’s lack 
of willingness to exercise power is the main reason for their lack of it. 
The exertion of hard power is, and has always been, a part of the American identity, the first 
newcomers in The United States exercised power when exterminating the native tribes from 
The North American continent (R. Kagan, 2003, p. 11). So it is an integrated part of the 
American identity, to use hard power, in terms of obtaining even more power, and profitable 
geographical territories. It can be argued that it is a philosophical matter, that The United 
States has no historic success with the use of soft power, so they are more inclined to exercise 
hard power. 
 
In Kagans theory EU is turning their back on the power, in the direction of a world system 
controlled by transnational negotiations, laws and cooperation. This is, according to Kagan, a 
post historical paradise of peace and relative welfare. 
On the contrary, The United States is exercising their power in an anarchic liberal world 
order where the international laws and regulations are seen as unreliable, and security and 
defense of the liberal world order relies on attendance and military power (R. Kagan, 2003, p. 
5).  
The United States and Europe has a still increasing cleft between them, the only things tying 
them together are the economic interdependens, and ideological agreements. But on a matter 
of national priorities, and assess possible threats and obstacles, and to plan foreign- and 
defense policies, the gap between The United States and Europe is, according to Kagan, 
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constantly increasing (R. Kagan, 2003, p. 5). This is, according to the factors related to power 
in Kagans book, a significant part of why The United States is the most powerful state in the 
world, and EU, according to Kagan, is not. 
  
In a conclusion to create the definition on Kagans view on the concept of power, one could 
argue that:  
The United States has a large amount of military power, and a great willingness to exercise 
this power, therefore Kagan is arguing that The United States have a lot of power, or they are 
very powerful. 
Europe has a smaller amount of military power than The United States, and furthermore they 
are not inclined to use this power, unless it is, according to The EU, very necessary. 
Therefore Kagan argues that Europe is not that powerful. 
Furthermore the national identity and the geographical situations also have a significant 
influence on the amount of power, which given states possess. 
 
3.2 Stephen Haselers description of power: 
 
Haseler describes the Franco-German core of the Eurozone as a ”magnet for other EU 
countries (even including Britain)” that will ”drive Europe towards a common defense and 
foreign policy, and, thus, full superpower-hood” (S. Haseler, 2004, p. IX). ”Superpower-
hood” is here set equal to a common defense and foreign policy or at least stated as the 
characteristic EU is missing. This conception of the military aspect of power is reinforced 
when Haseler argues that ”the only power center that has the potential to balance and check 
US power in the world is EU (And the only if it finally creates a foreign and defense policy)” 
(S. Haseler, 2004, p. X). The US can though ”be expected to look unfavorably on any 
strategic unification of EU” (S. Haseler, 2004, p. IX). This indicates that a further strategic 
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and defensive cooperation would impose a power threat to the US.  
Haseler openly states a federalist approach to the future of EU and considers what he calls 
American federalism. 
 
Haseler proceeds to list some aspects of power that the EU and the US have in common 
which is most importantly ”a continent-wide system, similar issues of federal-state relations, 
similar population size and similar level of economic (along with cultural) development”. 
Also listed is ”similar ideology and values” (S. Haseler, 2004, p. X). 
 
Haseler defines Europe as a great civilian power (S. Haseler, 2004, p. 1). This is mostly in the 
sense of intergovernmental or in some cases supranational economic co-operation and 
structures. Most importantly in this definition of power is use of primarily economic, rather 
than military means of defending national interest. This leads Haseler to conclude that 
economic strength is only an element of global power if the EU “acts as one” (S. Haseler, 
2004, p. 2). Making use of a dispute between the US and EU over steel tariffs resulting in the 
bush presidency backing down he argues by EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy words 
that ”when Europe is united it can play a role in world affairs that corresponds to its weight” 
(S. Haseler, 2004, p. 2).  This means that economic prosperity is a vital part of the concept of 
power. That is however only if the economy can be utilized by unity. When Kagan describes 
the concept of power in connection to EU as a future superpower he precisely mentions 
aspects of power that the EU and US more or less both possess and most importantly 
elements that constitutes power: ”The population, the skills, the potential technological and 
military resources and, above all, the economy” (S. Haseler, 2004, p. 2). 
 
As described in the methods section Haseler also approach the topic of EU superpower-hood 
with a liberal approach, meaning an emphasis on a different western approach to the world. 
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This indicates that a ”social model – of capitalism with a social vision” (S. Haseler, 2004, p. 
5). This is a displacement of the concept of “power” from, as before mentioned, very 
materialistic to also include concepts as democratic values, softer capitalism and most 
importantly shared ideas and understanding of a European identity of freedom and equality. 
It is very important to include this aspect, even though it does not completely correspond 
with Kagans concept of power. One should especially take note of the military aspect which 
Kagan stresses. Haseler too states that soft power is not enough to be considered a 
superpower and in that sense that soft power is only a small part of what constitutes global 
power: ”Soft power alone does not an independent superpower make! Europe will need 
increased military and intelligence resources to provide against threats to its own security and 
to project power” (S. Haseler, 2004, p. 7). 
 
It should be clear form the above extracts that Haseler defines global power with some 
aspects differing from Kagan like ideology, values and world approaches. It is though 
consistently downplayed by the role of hard power and materialistic measurements of power 
and measurable variables overall as military, intelligence resources, population size, 
technological resources and again, above all, the economy. 
 
3.3 The Concept of power:  
 
Through our analysis of both Haseler and Kagan we wished to investigate their perceptions 
of the tangled concept of power. There are always different conceptions of what power is, as 
it is a rather relative concept, and there are too many different factors, which are to be taken 
into account. And the importance of these factors is different from each theorist. 
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And in order to complete our study we will have to create a definition of the concept of 
power, which we are referring to in our analysis and discussion further on in the project 
report. 
 
From the two papers by Kagan and Haseler we now have combined the most significant 
factors of the concept of power, which are recurring in the papers. 
The definition of power that we are working with is defined as the possession of following 
factors: 
 
- The willingness to assume the responsibilities for protecting other nations, this is defined 
by acting as a protector of other nations in terms of liberating them from, according to 
the powerful states ideals, evil regimes or protecting them from other risks. 
 
- The military strength and the willingness to use it, the power of a states military, the 
coherence of the military and the foreign policies. Also in the case of supranational 
authorities as the EU, the unity of the military strength is important. 
 
- Geographical prosperity is concerning the wealth of the geographical position and state, 
and the quantity and welfare of the population. 
 
- Powerful, unified and cooperative economic structures. Is a strong economy with 
extensive welfare, and in the case of Europe the unity and cooperation of the economies 
is also an important factor, in order for their economy to be powerful. 
 
- Common identity In terms of ideology, moral values and world approaches. Also shared 
goals are important, which for The United States is the spreading of their values of 
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liberalism etc. And for Europe it could be other humanitarian goals. 
 
These factors are all together stating the concept of power. If a state, or a union, succeeds to 
comply these factors they will, by our definition contain power. 
 
4. Analysis 
 
4.1 What would need to change in order to reach a higher degree of political unity and 
would this strengthen EU’s global role? 
 
4.1.1 Introduction: 
 
EU consists of an immensely wide range of policy areas which we naturally acknowledge to 
all have influence in a higher or lesser degree on the EU’s global role. It should though be 
clear that the areas, which we have selected to concentrate on in this section of political 
analysis, is chosen from the projects starting point – the concept of power. Every section has 
relevance and will be connected to concept of power after each subsection. This is with the 
exception of the economic aspect, which will later be analyzed in connection to the course of 
Economics. The section is thereby targeted areas that have been extracted from the theories 
of Robert Kagan and Stephen Haseler on global power. Some policy areas have been 
excluded from analysis if they did not fit into ”the concept of power”. 
 
4.1.2 Civilian power and military integration: 
 
When Haseler describes Europe as a ”civilian power” it does in this sense indicate a nation 
which power derives from economic cooperation rather than military cooperation. EU is by 
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the vast majority perceived as a ”civilian power” and this can be problematic in connection to 
its common identity and the utilization of global power. In order to continue we will need to 
state some characteristics that is consistent and recurring through our empirical material on 
the matter of a ”European identity”.  
 
        A European identity consists according to our empirical material broadly of ideological 
social-minded model of capitalism (S. Haseler, 2004, p. 5), ethnic and racial diversity  (S. 
Haseler, 2004, p. x), cultural tradition, peace (S. Haseler, 2004, p. 2) and very importantly 
values such as democracy and human rights (J. Orbie, 2008, p. 14). A unification of common 
understanding and participation towards preservation of these ideas is very often established 
through the political agenda and political discourse. More political unity and a common 
European ideology is argued by J. Orbie to only be worth something if it can be defended. 
EU High Representative Solana declared about the Petersberg tasks that ”we are not talking 
about collective defense. Nor are we talking about building a European army or militarizing 
the EU. But we cannot continue to publicly expose values and principles while calling on 
others to defend them” (J. Orbie, 2008, p. 14). This means that even though we will try to 
seperate military and politics into two separate arenas the two are often interconnected and in 
this case the political and ideological unification might impact the military aspect of global 
power as well. In other words  - military integration may or may not influence the civilian 
power model of the EU and the other way around. It can though also be argued ”coercive 
military action by the EU fits in with the CPE role, as a last resort, provided that there is an 
explicit mandate from the UN security council (cf. Biscop, 2003, p. 28-31).   
 
It has from the above section been pointed out that further ”Europeanization” can affect the 
need for use of military force. Wagner (2006) makes the point that a Europeanization, and in 
particular, ”Europeanization of defense leads to democratic deficit because it weakens 
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national parliaments’ capacity to control executive decisions to use military force, and 
because neither the European Parliament nor the former assembly of the WEU are able to 
compensate this loss of parliamentary control” He also states that other dimensions of 
democracy like ”transparency and openness of decision-making” which would also be 
included in the common perception of a European identity, could benefit from an EU 
common defense policy (J. Orbie, 2008, p. 16). This would mean a loss of sovereignty for the 
member states of course and a shift towards a more supranational approach to foreign politics 
than seen before.  
 
          If one were to base an argument on the European identity characteristic of civilian 
power and piece, Hazel Smith (2002) argues that: ”The particular and unique nature of 
European Union foreign policy – in particular, the visibility of its decision-making system – 
makes it difficult to engage in the worst types of foreign policy realpolitik. To sum up these 
arguments it appears that a higher political unification on defense matters would cause 
democratic deficits for the member states and thereby loss of sovereignty on this matter, but 
the structural mechanics of EU decision-making would only enforce its role as a civilian 
power as the political transparency would prevent any use of power that would not fit with 
the general European ideology.  
         A common military strategy in the EU could then strengthen the political unity as this 
would mean a relinquishment of some aspects of national sovereignty, which is in most cases 
is what happens when a shift from intergovernmentalism to supranationalism occurs. The 
debate on this issue mostly evolves around the question of whether a common defense 
strategy would challenge the strength and credibility of the European civilian power form. 
This question can be divided into the majority and the minority view (J. Orbie, 2008, p. 14). 
The majority view suggests that military means are to some extend necessary but emphasizes 
that two conditions have to be fulfilled: 1) They can only be used as a last resort, when all 
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other ”civilian instruments” have been deployed; and 2) They should be used to uphold 
”civilian values” such as democracy and human rights, rather than serving geopolitical and 
economic interests (J. Orbie, 2008, p. 14; Keukeleire, 2002, p. 20; Teló, 2007, p. 57). The 
minority view on the other hand suggests that military integration in the EU would contradict 
its identity as a civilian power – even if the emphasis remains on diplomatic and economic 
instruments. It would weaken the Union’s credibility, legitimacy and capacity on the 
international scene (Smith, 2002, p. 291).  
We should though be aware that this is a minority view according to a large amount of 
authors and “forces for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions [are] frequently considered 
“civilian” instruments” (J. Orbie, 2008, p. 14).  
 
                We could then partially conclude that a common military strategy in accordance 
with the civilian power form would not only strengthen political unity but also defend the 
very values and ideas that constitute ”civilian power”. Military power agreements are seen as 
a necessity according to J. Orbie rather than opportunity. Steps towards supranational 
decision-making, even if only in some arenas would overall strengthen the overall political 
unity of the EU (W. Kaiser, P. Starie, 2005, p. 61) The EU can though because of its 
incoherent military strategy an inability to reach a common military strategy, from the 
concept of power, arguably be considered as a lesser power compared to the US.  
 
4.1.3 Transnational socialization – common social problems: 
 
Political unity is a state achieved by political integration which is by Ernst Hass defined as 
”The process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to 
shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, yielding a new 
national consciousness of the new political community – a transnational process of political 
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spill-over” (W. Kaiser, P. Starie, 2005, p. 61). Political unity is from Hass’ definition only 
something, which can be achieved through a change of ones mindset. This proofs to us, that 
such concepts as national identity and European identity are important if not vital tools, 
considering EU as a democratic civilian power, in order to gain increased political unity in 
the EU.  
 
According to S. Baker it is though not only beneficial internally but also externally for EU’s 
foreign policy and relations. Normative power in the Europe is serving certain functions in 
the integration process. ”Values and principles forge a sense of group identity, can mobilize 
support for European integration, and distinguish the EU on the international stage” (J. Orbie, 
2008, p. 175). In the first section of the analysis we mentioned the legitimacy of EU on the 
international scene. Articulated shared values is here argued to have a legitimizing function 
an thereby also increasing the diplomatic and ”soft power” of EU  (J. Orbie, 2008, p. 175). 
This extends 
 
      Gilles Andreani describes the American mindset as ”emphasizing military, technical and 
unilateral solutions to international problems, possibly at the expense of co-operative and 
political ones” (Winter, 2000, p. 42-61). One aspect which in particular is important for what 
we could call the European mindset - that is the previously discussed common values and 
beliefs – is the social problems in EU of all sorts. Social welfare is not only worth a lot in the 
European mindset but also one of the most notable characteristics of EU (and most of 
Europe). ”Europeans not only live in the most stable, peaceful and prosperous region of the 
world, but also possess a quality of life that surpasses that of any other continent” (S. Haseler, 
2004, p. 1). It would then also be assumed that in order to integrate or centralize politics to a 
supranational level a good starting point would be a political agenda closely relatable to those 
of national governments. That means some core values that all or most of EU member states 
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share. As this helps governments ”realize their political goals better, nationally constituted 
political elites (in interest groups, parties and bureaucracies) orient their expectations and 
activities toward the integrated level of decision-making, build transnational coalitions (with 
the support of supranational organizations) and develop supranational perspectives on their 
political problems and their solutions  (W. Kaiser, P. Starie, 2005, p. 61). Even though the 
goal might be of self-interest the means can be of a cooperative manner. This represents 
especially Robert Kagans neorealist approach to IE but it is important to note that from the 
above description it is stated that the goal in itself can through the process undertake 
supranational perspectives. It is to some extend also irrelevant as all increases of 
transnational cooperation benefits political unification. Karl Deutch saw ”transnational 
exchanges and communication” as the product of ”Social learning processes and evidence of 
mutual relevance” (W. Kaiser, P. Starie, 2005, p. 5). Especially the element of mutual 
relevance is important. Interdependence between member states is though not equal to 
unification as it bears more intergovernmental traits. However, a common political agenda 
and unified action to fulfill this will show a sign of supranationalism and political unity in the 
EU.   
 
This normative power of the EU extends beyond EU According to Professor Ian Manners. He 
propose that “EU partnership and dialogue with third world countries will promote common 
values of: respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good 
governance, gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity and justice” (Z. Laïdi, 2008, p. 23) 
this means that EU is strongly committed to effective multilateralism, which bears 
resemblance to the US Imperialistic characteristic. According Ian Manners it is though hard 
to determine the extend to which EU is willing to act as a normative power because of its 
“polycentric polity and policy breadth, as well as the increasingly transnational nature of the 
global world in which the EU is trying to act (Z. Laïdi, 2008, p. 23). 
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         Karl Deutch’s definition of integration can very briefly sum up how social problems 
and solutions can influence political unity: ”[Integration is] the attainment, within a territory, 
of a ”sense of community” – understood as the belief on the part of individuals in a group 
that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems 
must and can be resolved by processes of ’peaceful change’” (K. Deutch, 1957, p. 5).  
 
European transnational socialization, as argued by Kaiser and Staire, ”adds a further layer to, 
rather than replace, beliefs and practices learned in the domestic context.” ” (W. Kaiser, P. 
Starie, 2005, p. 77). This can be explained with that ”the national context is still the site of 
primary political socialization” as EU citizens, political activists, interest group 
representatives and bureaucrats, who influence the political agenda, ”first go through 
processes of national political socialization.” this socialization happens through ”national 
schools, mass media, social organizations and bureaucracies.” (W. Kaiser, P. Starie, 2005, p. 
77) Just as a neorealist would argue that states are self-interested the same conclusion can be 
extracted from the above citation as the common European identity is dominated by the 
domestic and national identity to which the primary interests and goals belong. ”National 
identities are stronger than European identities” (W. Kaiser, P. Starie, 2005, p. 77) however 
as it is subsequently argued ”elites have a stronger European identity, have oriented their 
perceptions and activities more strongly beyond national borders, and are, on an average, 
more integration-friendly” (W. Kaiser, P. Starie, 2005, p. 77).  “The elite” then best carries 
out transnational socialization and unification on common social problems. This would 
indicate an institutional shift in the EU decision-making structure and overall a renouncement 
of a big portion of national sovereignty, which is not easily achieved with a current high 
amount of “euro-skepticism” in many European countries.  
 
Concluding, a higher sense of political unity would integration-wise mean more legislative 
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power to those bodies of EU more “integration-friendly”. Bodies such, as the European 
Council is a good example of how national interests are highly represented in the EU political 
agenda. “Effects of European transnational socialization are likely to increase with the 
‘entitativity’ of the European Union, that is, the more it becomes a tangible and persisting 
‘reality’ with immediate and direct relevance, and impact on, the daily lives and activities of 
individuals and organizations” (W. Kaiser, P. Starie, 2005, p. 77). It is though hard to know 
how to increase the pace of transnational socialization as the “instrumental dimension of 
socialization becomes less clear the more we get down to the attitudes of ordinary citizens at 
the grass roots” (W. Kaiser, P. Starie, 2005, p. 78). Furthermore the study of foreign aspects 
of European identity promotion is hard to study because of the difficult mixture of 
“normative ethics that shape the EU’s relations with the globalized world, including virtue, 
deontological and consequentialist normative ethics”  (Z. Laïdi, 2008, p. 23). These two last 
statements seem logical as the EU does consist of many member states with very differing 
degrees of participation/integration willingness.  Finally, even though normative power, in 
the context of the concept of power is not emphasized, it can be argued that transnational 
socialization can lead to a stronger political and military unity which is considered valid 
power sources.  
 
 
4.1.4 Sustainable development as a moral responsibility: 
 
How one exercises power is greatly determined by ones ideology. Kagan argues that 
”consequences transatlantic disparity of power (…) has opened a broad ideological gap.” 
Because of Europe’s unique history in creating the EU. they have developed a set of ”ideals 
and principles” ”regarding the utility and morality of power” which is different from the 
”ideals and principles of Americans who have not shared that experience” (R. Kagan, 2003, 
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p. 11). The United States has willingness to assume the responsibility of protecting other 
nations (R. Kagan, 2003, p. 11) and acts as a self-appointed ”international sheriff” trying to 
”enforce peace and justice in what Americans see as a lawless world where outlaws needs to 
be deterred or destroyed” (R. Kagan, 2003, p. 35-36). The morality and utility of power can 
be connected to the previous section on the ”European mindset” or ”European identity”. 
Power is willingness to assume the responsibility of protecting or helping other countries. Of 
course ideology plays a vital role in what goals power is utilized. It is then also apparent that 
EU possesses high amounts of power and influence on the policy areas and causes that align 
with its ideology like sustainable development. The idea that ”ecological modernization 
could offer European industry a competitive advantage” was first brought to attention by the 
fourth EAP (1987-92) (J. Orbie, 2008, p. 160-61). The advantage of international leadership 
on certain policy areas will always help to contribute to a nation power status. And even 
though Environmental policy is of soft power ”the ambition to play a leading role in 
international environmental politics was initially driven by economic objectives” which 
contributes to the capacity of hard power (J. Orbie, 2008, p. 161). From the 1990’s the EU 
declared itself as ”economically, politically, but also morally, predestined to exercise global 
environmental leadership” (J. Orbie, 2008, p. 161). Political Science professor James 
Sperling seemingly points out EU’s global environmental role when he writes that 
“Environmental and consumer protection advocacy groups generally point to the EU as an 
exemplar for regulating industry and improving environmental conditions nationally and 
globally” (J, Sperling, L. Tossutti, 2007/S. Lucarelli, L. Fioramonti, 2010, p. 23). This 
indicates a possession, of in this case diplomatic and economic power, and willingness to 
exercise it. Orbie though argues that integration is yet again the issue in order to gain a 
”power base” for its leadership. ”To support its claim as a leader in sustainable development, 
the EU needed to react collectively and develop a European policy for those themes which 
dominated the international environmental debate. On the other hand, the integration of the 
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internal market (…) was stagnating yet again” (J. Orbie, 2008, p. 161). It is from this clear 
that further economic integration is necessary in order to collectively act on policy issues like 
this. This statement is furthermore reinforced by Edith Brande’s statement that ” The 
economic dimension is often described as the EU’s core power. Europe’s environmental 
presence on the world stage stems from its internal economic activities” (J. Orbie, 2008, p. 
162). This has also to do with the gatekeeping aspect of enforcing environmental standards 
on EU’s trading partners. Just as the economy supports EU’s environmental leadership it 
works the other way. It seems that the ”value of sustainable development has influenced 
Europe’s external policies as a whole – even if the trade administrations have attempted to 
consolidate the position of the EU as a green leader” (J. Orbie, 2008, p. 163). Equally James 
Sperling enforces this view of EU: “The EU is viewed as a mechanism for enforcing higher 
environmental standards in the US through the extra-territorial application of law made 
possible by the importance of the European Market to the US industry” (S. Lucarelli, L. 
Fioramonti, 2010, p. 23). 
 The EU’s green mission is not only motivated by ”economic and environmental” goals, but 
in a high degree also, as a foreign policy objective where leadership is used to legitimize its 
actions (Grupp, Gupta, 2000, p. 79). Orbie though questions the usefulness of leadership on 
soft power policy areas. He agrees that climate policy was used to and can demonstrate the 
power of the EU as a ”front-runner in international commitments.” ”Yet its leadership 
ambition was rather ’symbolic politics’ and many questioned its capacity to implement 
internally” (J. Orbie, 2008, p. 173). James Sperling does contrarily not think that “symbolic 
politics” is neccesarily a bad thing. He argues that EU’s efforts on environmental policy 
advocate the “EU precautionary principle” rather than the American principle of “safe until 
proven otherwise”. (S. Lucarelli, L. Fioramonti, 2010, p. 24). Many advocacy groups 
therefore view the EU as an important actor, and “in most cases the EU is seen as a 
progressive institution protecting civil society from rapacious industrialist and financiers.” 
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EU is according the James Sperling “taken seriously as an actor with global impact and 
importance” (S. Lucarelli, L. Fioramonti, 2010, p. 24).  
 
This concluding means that even though EU’s arguable role as a leader on environmental 
policy might not particularly be a form of power parallel to that of economic or military 
power, the integration on this area can be argued to cause spill-overs into other policy areas. 
Apart from that, the role of EU as a “gate-keeper” and standardizer will have economic 
possibilities, which can greatly contribute to its power. It is though clear that normative 
power can also over time lead to enhanced materialistic power. 
 
4.2 How would the implementation of a fiscal federation system like the one in the 
United States change the economy of the EU? 
 
4.2.1 Introduction and general opinion on monetary union and fiscal federation 
 
There exists a very clear connection between the field of political science and economics. 
The commitment of member states to European integration affects the mobilization of 
financial resources. This affects as previously mentioned areas such as social policy where 
supranationalism and further integration indicated a move towards a stronger European 
identity and thereby higher political legitimacy. Financial mobilization also has a big impact 
on EU’s (lack of) hard power forms as a defense force. “As a political community of 
sovereign member states, it remains reluctant to mobilize the financial resources and indeed 
the political commitment to launch even the most basic defense force” (E. Jones, A. Verdun, 
2005, p. 128). It is argued by Jones & Verdun that the EU possesses a big economic capacity 
but an inter-regional cooperation or supranational federalist economic approach is necessary 
in order to translate economic power into political power. “In the economic arena, the EU is 
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considered to be a major player in the global economy, and the volume of trade, investment, 
and financial flows stand as a testament to the economic strength of the bloc” (E. Jones, A. 
Verdun, 2005, p. 128). With this power at hand “the EU is able to translate its significant 
global economic power into cooperative efforts with other regions and thereby increase its 
global political influence” (E. Jones, A. Verdun, 2005, p. 128). Krugman similarly states the 
symbiosis between economic gains from closer integration and degree of political integration. 
“Economic policies were never just about the economics; they were always also about 
promoting European unity.” (P. Krugman, 2012, p. 88)  
 
        There exists a broad discussion of to which extend European economies should 
cooperate and to what extend supranational structures should dominate the political economy. 
Röttger on the one hand argues that “it is possible… to interpret the currently dominant EC 
integration as thoroughly successful ‘project’ [aimed at] tying together competing economic 
internationalization and regulation strategies and link them to interests in the periphery (E. 
Jones, A. Verdun, 2005, p. 115) On the other hand it is argued that even further 
internationalization and regulation is needed in order to create a stable and global economic 
power. Institutional liberalists claim, “International institutions help to promote cooperation. 
A high level of institutionalization significantly reduces the instability of the system” (E. 
Jones, A. Verdun, 2005, p. 130). 
We have many times used The United States as a reference to the concept of power. It is 
therefore useful to investigate if American federalists approaches to economic cooperation 
would be helpful for the economic power. That is in form a “fiscal federation” in the EU.  
 
According to several economists, an incorporation of a fiscal federation system like the one 
in the United States is inevitable if the European Union wants to maintain or enhance their 
global economic position. There is a growing consensus in comparative political economy 
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that globalization is not eliminating the distinctive character of specific nation states.  
“The absence of necessary convergence is nowhere more surprising than in Europe, where 
the remarkable development of the European Union must be added to the list of exogenous 
and endogenous challenges to national distinctiveness underscores the relative importance of 
other causal factors affecting the varieties”(E. Jones and A. Verdun, p.54). 
The proposed American system of fiscal federalism implies new institutions or bodies to 
monitor the budgets of member states, enforce fiscal discipline and impose punishments for 
repeat offenders of budget discipline rules. (Link 4)  
Many countries in Europe are however, still not willing to perform such a radical change in 
economic sovereignty, even though crises e.g. the Greek one has been the subject of recurrent 
discussions in political and academic circles. 
Combining the resources of the Eurozone countries and the Commission with those of the 
European Central Bank is a step beyond the stability and growth pact. Creating bodies 
capable of preventive action and successful intervention would imply that the pact has been 
replaced by a more feasible co-ordination.  
Several prominent economists have proposed concerns about Europe’s future as a strong 
economic force. Milton Friedman argues that Europe are not well prepared for asymmetric 
economic shocks, while others suggest that the European Union should introduce a similar 
system of fiscal federalism like the current one in The United States.  
    
4.2.2 Fiscal Integration in the EU 
 
Krugman introduces advantages and disadvantages of monetary unity in EU. Having 
different currencies within a system or society means that “cross-border business is more 
expensive if currencies must be exchanged, multiple currencies kept on hand, and/or bank 
accounts in multiple currencies maintained” (P. Krugman, 2012, p. 88). On the contrary he 
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argues that national economic stability can sometimes benefit from devaluation—“reducing 
the value of your currency in terms of other currencies can sometimes ease the process of 
adjusting to an economic shock” (P. Krugman, 2012, p. 88). As Krugman argues it is hard to 
weigh and evaluate the value of economic flexibility and the gains from a shared currency. 
The concept of a monetary union does at the same time create a dilemma of European 
integration ambitions. As previously made clear the EU for both political and economic 
reasons prefers a high degree of European unity. But as every EU member state is not equally 
wealthy or politically authorized it is clear that not all member states would benefit from or 
benefit to a monetary union. For the most effective cooperation an “optimum currency area” 
would need to be selected. This would though contradict the aspiration for an “ever closer 
union”. Krugman makes an example of implications that could arise from a shared currency: 
“On one side, there are efficiency gains from sharing a currency: business costs decline, 
business planning presumably improves. On the other side, there is a loss of flexibility, which 
can be a big problem if there are large “asymmetric shocks” like the collapse of a housing 
boom in some but not all countries” (P. Krugman, 2012, p. 89). Krugman argues that EU’s 
lack of fiscal integration like The United States fiscal federalist system makes EU’s economy 
less flexible and more fragile towards asymmetric shocks. These shocks are buffered, to an 
important extent, by the federal government in The United States. Banks are furthermore 
guaranteed by a federal agency. An equal crisis in a EU country would however result in a 
worse national situation. With an example of the Ireland housing bubble, Krugman states that 
by contrast, it is “mostly on its own, having to bail out its own banks, having to pay for 
retirement and health care out of its own greatly diminished revenue” (P. Krugman, 2012, p. 
90).  
 
Decentralization of power and reluctance to sacrifice national sovereignty can be seen as an 
obstacle for a European model of economics suitable for a single currency. “ Weak labor 
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mobility, the lack of a central government and the automatic buffering such a government 
would provide added to the doubts.” (P. Krugman, 2012, p. 90). The EU, according to 
Krugman, defended the lack of fiscal integration to prevent economic damage from 
asymmetric shocks by the statement that nations of the euro area would follow sound 
policies. “There would be no such “asymmetric shocks,” and if they did somehow happen, 
“structural reform” would render European economies flexible enough to make the necessary 
adjustments” (P. Krugman, 2012, p. 90). Milton Friedman is though as Krugman skeptical 
towards the European Monetary Union without fiscal integration. He argues that with the 
addition of more countries, EU “is becoming ever-more susceptible to any asymmetric shock. 
Sooner or later, when the global economy hits a real bump, Europe’s internal contradictions 
will tear it apart” (P. Schmid, J. Dreyer, 2013, p. 3). Many Authors argue that an integrated 
and common fiscal policy helps to stabilize interregional economies. With the example of 
The United States, many authors has similarly come to the conclusion that a “federal tax and 
expenditure system partly offsets idiosyncratic shocks to regional economies within The 
United States based on the performance of relative personal income. Apart from this 
stabilization effect of net fiscal transfers, it also contributes to the stabilization of GDP” (P. 
Schmid, J. Dreyer, 2013, p. 4).  
 
Concluding, it can be argued that devaluation can serve as a stabilizer of economic shocks 
but on the other hand there is also trade benefits in economic integration. It is also apparent 
that EU lacks an even further fiscal integration and economic stabilization.  EU is though 
according to Friedman and Krugman more sensible to asymmetric economic shocks. Schmid 
and Dreyer furthermore points out the importance of fiscal federalism and the stabilizing 
effects this has, which will be investigated even further in the next section. 
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4.2.3 Economic and Workforce Mobilization 
 
With Krugman’s argumentation for an American model of fiscal federalism’s ability to 
stabilize the effects of asymmetric economic shocks it could be seen as an optimal way for 
EU to secure and “cushion” its relatively fragile monetary union. Some barriers do though 
exist. The United States does in contrast to the EU and in particular the EZ, display a high 
degree of willingness to move between regions. “This is regarded as one reason why 
unemployment rates vary much less in The United States despite the occurrence of 
asymmetric economic shocks” ” (P. Schmid, J. Dreyer, 2013, p. 8). One of the EU’s 
characteristics of diversity and multiculturalism is greatly contributing to the identity of EU 
but can at the same time be an obstacle for cross-border movements. It is seen primarily in 
cultural and lingual differences in redeployment of workforce. The United States is culturally 
much more “homogenous”. The number of immigrants from outside and to the Euro-zone is 
in recent years “still too low to reduce the high level of unemployment differentials across the 
EZ significantly.” Thereby it seems that “inner-EZ migration does not seem to ensure 
economic stabilization in case of asymmetric shocks” (P. Schmid, J. Dreyer, 2013, p. 8).  
 
Economic redistribution and distribution of workforce can principally be seen as the same aid 
method – the method of circulating resources for the federal benefit. It would then be logical 
to assume that with the EU’s lack of regional mobility is even more in need of a fiscal federal 
economy or just deeper economic integration in order to comply with asymmetric economic 
shocks. Krugman though makes an argument that the geographical and economic situation in 
EU might not benefit from deeper monetary integration. He states that EU is vulnerable 
“because of its collection of nations that have their own budgets (because there’s very little 
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fiscal integration) and their own labor markets (because labor mobility is low) - but that don’t 
have their own currencies. And that creates a crisis” (P. Krugman, 2012, p. 93). Krugman 
furthermore talks about how national debt can force countries “into default”. He points out 
that any country that borrows in its own currency and has its own central bank, where 
“Federal Reserve could and would step in and buy federal debt, in effect printing money to 
pay the government’s bills” can avoid the constraint of debt. Countries now on the euro, can 
thus not count on the European Central Bank to provide cash in an emergency. (P. Krugman, 
2012, p. 95) 
 
“In the USA, the federal budget is the main source for government activities and thus 
national fiscal policy can cushion economic shocks in single geographical areas within the 
federation.” Moreover, labor mobility, as mentioned previously, is much higher in USA than 
in EU (P. Schmid, J. Dreyer, 2013, p. 29). The EU does currently not deliver the same 
cushioning economic safety. But with a common currency it is argued that it might be 
needed. “The entire EU budget by contrast is tiny and net contributions/receipts thereto too 
small for a currency union. Moreover, fiscal policies of single member states are restrained 
by the Stability and Growth Pact (…) and thus cannot serve as automatic stabilizers” (P. 
Schmid, J. Dreyer, 2013, p. 29). Krugman, when arguing how the EU can best be protected, 
also uses these lacks of economic stabilizers. This again draws on American federal 
characteristics. According the Krugman “The most obvious way to do this would be for the 
European Central Bank to stand ready to buy government bonds of euro nations.” (P. 
Krugman, 2012, p. 96). To sum up this Both Krugman and Schmid & Dreyer agrees that 
fiscal policies of single member states are not equipped to handle asymmetric economic 
shocks without more economic centralization. Also, in connection to redistribution and 
stabilization, Both Krugman and Schmid & Dreyer respectively with the example of the 
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Ireland/Nevada crisis and Hypothetical Fiscal Transfers within the Euro-zone more or less 
agree that the volume of net fiscal transfers between Euro-Zone members would have to be 
“much higher in order to provide the same type of redistribution and stabilization to these 
countries as present in the U.S. fiscal federalism system” (P. Schmid, J. Dreyer, 2013, p. 40). 
P. Schmid and J. Dreyer show the effect of net fiscal transfers between US states in contrast 
to Euro-Zone countries in figure 2. In connection to an economic crisis it is argued “net fiscal 
transfers in the USA necessarily dampen asymmetric shocks across the entire currency zone. 
In case of an adverse economic development in a specific state, the federal government 
collects less income and payroll taxes in this state, whereas expenditures for entitlement 
programmes and unemployment benefits rise automatically” (P. Schmid, J. Dreyer, 2013, p. 
12). It is apparent in the figure that both net fiscal transfer contributions and net fiscal transfer 
recipients in the Euro-zone is almost non-existing. Together with Krugmans argumentation of 
EU’s incapability to handle asymmetric economic shocks it seems that the lack of net fiscal 
transfers between member states is an economic barrier.  
 
Concluding, an fiscal federal governance in the EU can according to Krugman and Friedman 
“cushion” its relatively fragile monetary union. The EU does though have some obstacles. 
EU’s lack of regional mobility, due to heterogeneous cultural and lingual society, puts it even 
more in need of a fiscal federal economy or just deeper economic integration in order to 
comply with asymmetric economic. Also the issue of debt is discussed and it made clear how 
a federal reserve serves to provide redistribution and stabilization that is much needed in EU 
where, if a state is in debt is in higher degree “left to itself” in comparison to US states.  
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5. Discussion  
 
In the following section, we will discuss our gathered findings. We will comment on, and 
discuss our analysis while adopting an objective stance in order to present our material with a 
minimum of bias.  
As presented in our analysis section covering respectively, the prospect of an enforced 
European political and economic unification, we have laid the foundation for a more general 
discussion of what are the missing links in order for EU to develop into a superpower 
containing the elements of the previously defined concept of power.  
The theorists we have used to analyze our empirical data differ greatly in most aspects, but 
we have nonetheless been able to locate a quite common pattern in our material, which is; the 
notion that EU’s lack of unity politically and economically stands in the way of achieving 
‘true’ power. 
Many questions arose when we analyzed our material e.g. can EU achieve the status of a 
superpower without a military entity, would a fiscal federalism system inspired by The 
United States ensure economic stability, is economic dominance a sufficient ingredient in 
order to prevail as a superpower, does the qualities of soft power entail power, and of course 
what are the European prospects of power?    
We will thus, based on our findings elaborate on and discuss strengths and weaknesses of EU 
in current time, and propose a future pathway that might be en route. We will furthermore 
engage in a discussion about our hypothesis and how it may have proved to be consistent 
with our findings. The section will start with an ontological discussion as mentioned in the 
methods section. 
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5.1 Ontological approaches to the concept of power 
 
As we mentioned in the methods section our concept of power, composed by Kagan and 
Haseler has to some extend a positivist approach to international relations. Power is 
calculated from materialistic forces like military size, economic capability, and 
geographical/population size. The weight these have in the conclusion that the US is the 
world hegemon and incomparable superpower led us to exclude the significance of post-
positivist and constructivist conceptions of power, like ideology, common identity and 
willingness to serve as a world “protector”. These are, in connection to world power also 
mostly set aside in the discussion of superpower-hood where the US is consistently favored 
by its military, economic and geographical advantages. Our empirical material has raised 
many points and disagreement with the positivist materialistic understanding of power.   
W. Kaiser, P. Starie, K. Deutch, E. Jones, A. Verdun, P. Krugman, S. Haseler and R. Kagan 
are all in to some degree using this approach to power. It is though at the same time not at all 
excluded that EU’s possesses a normative power form, much more concerned with principles, 
ideas, values which is similarly consistently mentioned as, apart from the economy, some of 
EU’s strongest power sources. A majority in our empirical material though mentions the lack 
of military and further economic unity and that supports the idea of a concept of power 
mostly concerned with material variables. It is though, from our analysis clear that normative 
power cannot be ignored, and despite Kagan and Haseler’s ontological approach to the 
concept of power, the emphasis of normative power in our empirical material raises the 
question if the conception of power can be interpreted in a different way.  
 
We have previously mentioned EU as an exemplar for regulating industry and improving 
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environmental conditions nationally and globally. The declaration of EU as an 
”economically, politically, but also morally, predestined” leader in the exercise global 
environmental policy does show initiative to enforce European values globally. Even though 
the methods vary from the US this indicates a willingness to assume the responsibilities for 
protecting other nations, which is an important aspect in the concept of power section. “this 
is defined by acting as a protector of other nations in terms of liberating them from, according 
to the powerful states ideals, evil regimes or protecting them from other risks.” As 
environmental global risks have gained strong significance on the global political agenda it 
can be argued that the significance of EU as a global ideological leader is only a question of 
political discourse. The Common identity trait in terms of ideology, moral values and world 
approaches of the EU is in this connection also left out of many of our empirical material’s 
assessments of power. It is though understandable why the US can be considered more united 
in the sense of national identity. As W. Kaiser and P. Starie argued: “National identities are 
stronger than European identities”. The US is as we mentioned more homogenous in term of 
culture and language which helps to on one hand forge a stronger sense of common goals and 
values. But on the other hand the heterogeneous nature of European culture does, in contrast 
to the US, also hinder workforce mobility, which is an important economic aspect. 
 
But this diversity in the EU should maybe not be interpreted as only an obstacle. We should 
be aware that diversity an multiculturalism is an important characteristic of the EU. J. Orbie 
makes the very important statement that “values and principles forge a sense of group 
identity, can mobilize support for European integration, and distinguish the EU on the 
international stage”. Especially the latter is important for EU’s global role. Not only is the 
European identity important externally in connection to global politics but also the initiative 
for common engagement on this global scene has it starting point internally. We have many 
times stated the lack of political unity in our research. The unity should derive from common 
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political goals and goals of which runs parallel with the global identity of the EU. We argued 
that “it would be assumed that in order to integrate or centralize politics to a supranational 
level a good starting point would be a political agenda closely relatable to those of national 
governments.” This means for us that even though post-positivist and constructivist 
conceptions of power in international relations does not have a very significant role, the 
values and ideas that link to these could be a good starting point for both political and 
economic integration.  
 
With these observations in mind it is clear that from our ontological approach, the hypothesis 
deriving therefrom and the resulting conclusion that it does only present a perception and 
conception of power from the ontology of Kagan and Haseler. As discussed above many 
other elements of power contributes to “superpower-hood”. It is therefore interesting to 
evaluate these as they challenge a broad opinion among many authors on international 
relations. An even more fundamental ontological debate arise therefrom. Can power only be 
evaluated from materialistic forces and does that constitute a true concept of “power”? we 
have chosen to avoid this question as our only concerns is changes of EU power in 
connection to only the point of view of Kagan an Haseler.  
 
5.2 Political Discussion 
 
As previously mentioned there is undoubtedly an aspect that amplifies and aggravates EU’s 
global power. In many respects, European countries retain individual national sovereignty 
and each EU nation most commonly prioritizes its own country's interests rather than those of 
Europe. 
”National identities are stronger than European identities” (W. Kaiser, P. Starie, 2005, p. 77) 
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This can respectively be perceived as a luxury as well as an obstacle e.g. in relation to foreign 
policy, it could be argued that if the EU wants to achieve a predominant military force and a 
coherent foreign policy agenda, it faces objectives that requires a centralization of interests. 
As stated in our definition of power, military strength entails military alignment and 
enhanced co-operation preserved by an internal endogenous monitoring authority. Thus, EU 
faces specific objectives in relation to requiring the necessary ‘strength’ needed in order to be 
‘responsible for the protection of other nations’.  
”We are not talking about collective defense. Nor are we talking about building a European 
army or militarizing the EU. But we cannot continue to publicly espouse values and 
principles while calling on others to defend them” (J. Orbie, 2008, p. 14).  
The process of engaging in a more prominent political unification is also one of the aspects 
we elaborate on in our analysis section. How can enhanced political unification promote 
EU’s power status, and how is it achieved. By our definition of power, it is clear that a 
common identity is a necessary feature in order to achieve the status of a superpower like The 
US.  
Political integration is:  
”The process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to 
shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, yielding a new 
national consciousness of the new political community – a transnational process of political 
spill-over” (W. Kaiser, P. Starie, 2005, p. 61). 
Political unity is according to several theorists one of the characteristics that has enabled The 
US to retain its position as a global hegemon and a point of criticism in the European Union’s 
political sphere.    
It could be assumed that in order to integrate or centralize politics to a supranational level a 
good starting point would be a political agenda closely relatable to those of national 
governments. That means some core values that all or most of EU member states share. The 
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question though remains if it is possible to align interest or if national interests differ too 
much internally 
 
5.3 Economic discussion: 
 
The EU is an undeniable big economic power on the global scene. The Monetary Union was 
a step towards economic integration and an effort to make internal and external trade more 
efficient. There exist doubt among scholars on to what extend the EU was prepared for a 
single currency and an even bigger doubt to if it was fitted for a fiscal federal system like the 
one in the US. One argument for a fiscal federation mentions that the EU is becoming ever 
more susceptible to any asymmetric shock. Sooner or later, when the global economy hits a 
real bump, Europe’s internal contradictions will tear it apart”. The lack of economic unity 
was clear through the Greek economic crisis and the comparison between Ireland and Nevada 
proved even stronger the advantages of fiscal federalism in the EU. Our political analysis 
raised the point of national sovereignty, which will always be a problem if the EU is trying to 
achieve further economic integration. The US stands stronger on this area they are, as 
previously mentioned, more culturally homogenous. A high degree of “euro-skepticism” 
exists among EU member states and real political and economic integration stalls from this 
obstacle. Moreover, fiscal policies of single member states are restrained by the Stability and 
Growth Pact and thus cannot serve as automatic stabilizers. From our analysis it also seems 
that in order for the EU to maintain its position as a strong economic actor it must have some 
degree of stabilization in case of unexpected crises. Krugman argue; “The most obvious way 
to do this would be for the European Central Bank to stand ready to buy government bonds of 
euro nations.” This resembles a form of economic integration and supranational governance 
in the form a fiscal federalism.  
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One thing our empirical material can agree on is that the volume of net fiscal transfers 
between Euro-Zone members would have to be “much higher in order to provide the same 
type of redistribution and stabilization to these countries as present in the U.S. fiscal 
federalism system”. Fiscal federal governance in the EU could then according to Krugman 
and Friedman “cushion” its relatively fragile monetary union. Again here, national 
sovereignty is the big problem. Let’s take Denmark as an example. Because of an opt-out 
from the European Monetary Union but an involvement in the European exchange-rate 
mechanism, ERM2 where the euro is the anchor currency. This means that Denmark has the 
change to bail-out at any time. Krugman furthermore argues that national economic stability 
can sometimes benefit from devaluation—“reducing the value of your currency in terms of 
other currencies can sometimes ease the process of adjusting to an economic shock”. It would 
then take a common and united decision to lose some national sovereignty to a fiscal 
federalism, which would, according to our material, act as an even stronger security for 
asymmetric economic shocks. It is though as we also mentioned previously important to note 
that it could take time for a fiscal federation to satisfy every member as not all EU member 
states are equally in need of such a solution.  
 
The weak labor mobility in the EU in comparison to US might be one of the very strong 
arguments for a fiscal federation. As asymmetric shocks under low labor mobility is hard to 
deal with a fiscal federal system like the one in the US would help to “cushion” the EU 
economy. 
 
5.4 Future of EU Power: 
 
In relation to EU’s possible future as the global superpower with the attributes defined 
earlier, there are quite a huge variety of differing opinions. Most of our empirical material 
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suggests that EU has a strong soft power e.g. values, culture etc. and a strong competitive 
economy but lacks military force. Our theorist suggests that if EU created common defense 
policies they would stand strong, but national interests has to be aligned in order to do so, 
which are thus the current objective. Others consider EU to be in possession of the required 
attributes already and a good substitute for The United States. 
“Fortunately, there is another power that shares America’s economic and political values, that 
possesses sophisticated military technology and is also very interested in stopping the 
progress of fanatical movements, especially in North Africa and the Middle East. That power 
is Europe”. (Link 5) 
Another factor, which is also a necessary component in the process of taking on the burden of 
a superpower, is a strong economy. EU is currently the world’s largest market, but does 
according to our theorists lack an American inspired fiscal federalism system in order to 
avoid/handle future financial setbacks. Once again, our material implies that further 
unification among EU member states is required, in order to prevent such setbacks. European 
citizens should think like Europeans and act as ‘one’ politically, economically etc. in order to 
enhance their global position.           
 
5.5 The hypothesis: 
 
A broad agreement seems to exist in our analysis that a stronger European identity can result 
in common political goals and thereby. But more political unity and a common European 
ideology is argued by J. Orbie to only be worth something if it can be defended by a military 
force. At the same time this Europeanization of politics can affect the need for use of military 
force. An important point is also made that Europeanization of defense or political military 
integration leads to democratic deficit because it weakens national parliaments. Furthermore 
it could also contradict the normative power form that the EU has established as we pointed 
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out in the analysis. This means that political integration could distinguish EU on the global 
scene and common action could legitimize military enhancement and integration. But as a lot 
of EU’s power according to our empirical material lies in its normative power, big military 
power and willingness to us it could contradict the normative power aspect.  An argument is 
though also raised that EU’s complex decision-making structures and transparency and 
publicly available parts of decision-making would equalize the deficit. Also you could argue 
that the military goals set out by the EU is very concerned with peacekeeping and 
humanitarian missions which are frequently considered “civilian” instruments” and it could 
on that basis one the one hand maybe even enhance the EU’s as a civilian power. It would on 
the other hand not align well with the concept of power. The military aspect would then need 
to look more like the American model of use. 
 
We have through our economical analysis raised the suggestion of a fiscal federation in the 
EU. As mentioned before economics and politics are closely related and with the great 
diversity existing in the EU, national sovereignty could be a big problem for effective 
economic cooperation. For the most effective cooperation an “optimum currency area” could 
be selected. Some countries will of course benefit from a fiscal federation more than others. 
This would as argued earlier though contradict the aspiration for an “ever closer union”. 
Friedman though mentions that a Monetary Union without fiscal integration, with the 
addition of more countries joining EU would result in an ever-more susceptible EU that 
would not be prepared to any asymmetric shocks. Also an implementation of a fiscal 
federation in EU may not be just like the American model as the two powers and culturally 
very different which in the case of EU could hinder work-force mobility. That could though 
only indicate stabilization effect of net fiscal transfers would only be even more necessary to 
contribute to the stabilization of GDP. We can from our empirical material argue that current 
net fiscal transfers are too low to reduce the high level of unemployment differentials across 
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the EZ significantly.  
    Even though there exists some barriers and that lack of economic unity might be an 
obstacle Krugman argues the most obvious way to deal with asymmetric economic shocks 
would be for the European Central Bank to stand ready to buy government bonds of euro 
nations.” The system that hypothetically would be adopted in the EU would then maybe not 
be exactly like the American model but would adapt to the internal conditions in the EU. We 
can though from our empirical material extract that not all requirements for a fiscal federation 
exist in the EU it would economically be cushioned be such an implementation. It is though 
not certain that closer economic integration would directly result in bigger materialistic 
power but it could provide a safer environment for the economic capacities of the EU to be 
utilized for e.g. military purposes and thereby get closer the concept of power. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The United States large economy and great military force, and the national unity and 
perceptive ideology are some of the greater reasons for The United States to contain their 
superior role as the global hegemon. Because of these factors, it is almost always The United 
States, which is the comparison when talking in terms of power. But somehow the link 
between power and the EU is non-existing.  
We have created a concept of power, which we use to analyze to what degree we believe EU 
can challenge The United States on the global power scene, if a centralization and a political 
and economic unity is being implemented. 
 
If EU is to challenge this position, which is being possessed by The United States, they will 
have to create a higher degree of centralization and a common political and economic unity 
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entity. If the EU is able to integrate the political unity, they will in terms of common identity 
possess a significant amount of power.  
Furthermore the EU’s geographical prosperity is advantageous, in terms of the central 
location in the geography of the world, even though the geographical positions are being less 
significant as the transportations are improving, it is still a huge advantage to possess a 
geographical profitable position and prosperity in terms of wealthy natural resources.   
 
If EU is to integrate a fiscal federation, and a common responsibility in terms of rescuing the 
different states from potential economic decline some actions are necessary. In order for this 
to come through, a political unity is inevitable. As an, in this case a common, supranational 
identity is a necessity if the system is to be well functioning. But EU will still need some 
degree of stabilization, if a crisis occur to some of the member states, the easiest way to do so 
would be if the European Central Bank was ready to buy bonds off euro nations – This 
resembles a form of economic integration and supranational governance in the form a fiscal 
federalism. But in order for the EU to function as a fiscal federation, the member states 
would have to give up their national sovereignty, because if the fiscal policies are to work, 
then the states cannot have the option to opt out if the things do not happen as planned, this 
can again be related to the common identity and the willingness to assume the responsibilities 
for protecting other nations in terms of having a ‘supranational identity’ where one state do 
not act from selfish reasons, but for the greater good of the EU. 
 
If the EU is able to encapsulate it’s strengths and integrate the concepts of a supranational 
state with a perceptive common identity, then it is a certain possibility that there could be 
discussed a new global power scene, with a bipolar system instead of the current unipolar 
system. 
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It is definite that, other things being equal, if EU centralizes the political and economic 
policies, and the military force, EU could be considered a superpower equal with The United 
States. 
 
 
7. Afterthoughts: 
 
When we look at our project in retrospect, we are quite satisfied with the outcome. We have 
set out to investigate whether or not EU is in possession of the attributes that constitutes a 
superpower and have done so. We investigated whether or not a higher degree of 
centralization would enhance EU’s global position and came up with a corresponding 
conclusion. We elaborated on, and addressed the issue of acting as one, which have 
historically been a problem for the European Union e.g. in relation to the recent financial 
crisis.  
We have furthermore been able to verify/falsify our hypothesis with the use of thorough 
content analysis and logical deduction.  
During our work-process ideas emerged and we began to put our area of research in to 
perspective. If we have had time for it, the thought of drawing parallels between the current 
world order and the one prior to the cold war were appealing. By drawing, those parallels we 
would engage in an interesting investigation that might enable us to exhibit differences 
between a unipolar and a bipolar global power system and predict if the latter is even possible 
in current times.  
The focus of this project was though, to engage in a thorough investigation of EU’s power 
and by that point, we feel we came through. 
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